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Abstract
Tensor network decomposition, originated from quan-
tum physics to model entangled many-particle quantum sys-
tems, turns out to be a promising mathematical technique
to efficiently represent and process big data in parsimo-
nious manner. In this study, we show that tensor networks
can systematically partition structured data, e.g. color im-
ages, for distributed storage and communication in privacy-
preserving manner. Leveraging the sea of big data and
metadata privacy, empirical results show that neighboring
subtensors with implicit information stored in tensor net-
work formats cannot be identified for data reconstruction.
This technique complements the existing encryption and
randomization techniques which store explicit data repre-
sentation at one place and highly susceptible to adversarial
attacks such as side-channel attacks and de-anonymization.
Furthermore, we propose a theory for adversarial exam-
ples that mislead convolutional neural networks to mis-
classification using subspace analysis based on singular
value decomposition (SVD). The theory is extended to ana-
lyze higher-order tensors using tensor-train SVD (TT-SVD);
it helps to explain the level of susceptibility of different
datasets to adversarial attacks, the structural similarity of
different adversarial attacks including global and localized
attacks, and the efficacy of different adversarial defenses
based on input transformation. An efficient and adaptive
algorithm based on robust TT-SVD is then developed to de-
tect strong and static adversarial attacks.
1. Introduction
Tensor computing recently emerges as a promising
mathematical technique for big data processing and an-
alytics [14, 16]. Big data serves as the fuel in driving
deep learning models that create tremendous value for var-
ious applications, ranging from science, business, to gov-
ernment. Deep learning automates the process of feature
extraction and exploits their compositionality to construct
Figure 1. Global and localized adversarial examples, as diverse as
their form can take, share similar structural properties in increas-
ing the image roughness. This is because the sensitivity of sub-
space approximation by convolutional neural networks (CNNs) is
controlled by the decay rate of singular values of the input image.
The larger the decay rate, the smoother is the image input, and the
more robust is the approximation. Our proposed robust TT-SVD
algorithm linearly combines the singular values and vectors that
fall within a (prescribed) bin to examine the robustness.
high-level features that achieve human-level performance
in many designated tasks such as classification and pre-
diction [44]. The tradeoff, however, involves storage and
processing of large amount of (labeled) data and models
with millions to billions of parameters. The data explo-
sion growth is expected to outpace the development of stor-
age and processing technology, therefore domain-specific
hardware acceleration and algorithmic codesign all aim to
improve throughput and energy-efficiency without compro-
mising model performance and hardware costs to cater for
widespread deployment of deep learning models [65]. Shar-
ing of personal and confidential data across organizations
demand cutting-edge privacy-preserving technology. Cur-
rent privacy-preserving technologies such as encryption and
randomization techniques share a common drawback that
any security breaches such as leakage of decryption key or
the data content during the storage, communication, or com-
putation phases expose the individual records that contain
explicit information. Therefore, it is timely and essential to
explore new data structures which provide not only efficient
and distributed storage and computation, but also privacy
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preservation such that data leakage provides the adversary
partial (implicit or latent) information of individual records
and reconstruction is difficult without knowledge of the data
structure.
Deep learning models, despite their impressive perfor-
mance, are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks that at-
tempt to perturb the inputs in subtle manner (impercepti-
ble or quasi-imperceptible) to achieve the adversary’s mo-
tives such as targeted or untargeted misclassifications. This
has serious implications especially because these models
are increasingly being deployed for mission-critical and
safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles
and robotics. Existing theories on adversarial examples
such as models’ linearity and non-linearity hypotheses, di-
mensional analyses, etc. do not generalize to different ad-
versarial attacks, these theories typically stem from local
empirical observations and do not fully align with each
other [4]. In this paper, we conduct both theoretical and ex-
perimental studies using tensor networks as data structure
for the input data of convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
and analyze their robustness to adversarial attacks. Our con-
tributions include:
• Propose to use tensor network representations for dis-
tributed storage of input data for machine learning
models. In particular, the model performance, stor-
age, and compression / decompression efficiency are
benchmarked for CNNs. Empirical results based on
information theory show that neighboring subtensors
with implicit / latent information cannot be identified
for data reconstruction. The robustness of tensor net-
work representations subject to perturbation of the sub-
tensors is also investigated.
• Propose a theory based on subspace analysis using sin-
gular value decomposition (SVD) for adversarial ex-
amples in CNNs. Using the theory, we quantify the ro-
bustness of different datasets to adversarial attacks, an-
alyze the efficacy of different defense techniques based
on input transformation and the structural similarity of
different adversarial attacks. The theory is extended
to analyze higher-order tensors with tensor-train SVD
(TT-SVD) and an efficient algorithm is proposed to de-
tect strong and static adversarial attacks (see Fig. 1).
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2
presents the preliminary knowledge of tensor networks such
as tensor formats, properties, and storage complexity. The
proposed robust TT-SVD algorithm for adversarial detec-
tion is presented in Section 2.1. Section 3 covers the threat
model, adversarial attacks and defenses in CNNs. Experi-
mental studies are conducted and the results are discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 provide the related work and
conclusion respectively.
2. Tensor Networks (TN)
Tensor decomposition has found many applications in
signal processing and machine learning. Many review pa-
pers have been published throughout the years, more recent
and relevant to machine learning and big data applications
include [14, 16, 61, 56, 15, 5, 25]. The basic tensor formats
and properties are summarized here.
Canonical Polyadic (CP) decomposition is one of the
most popular tensor technique due to the ease of interpre-
tation. CP is expressed as the sum of rank-1 components
A(i1, · · · , id) ∼=
R∑
r=1
U1(i1, r) U2(i2, r) · · ·Ud(id, r), (1)
where A is a d-dimensional tensor, r is the canonical rank
and Uj is the latent factor in scalar representation. Each
rank-one component of the decomposition serves as a latent
concept or cluster in the data. The latent factors can be in-
terpreted as soft membership to the r-th latent cluster. CP is
unique up to scaling and permutation of the r components
under very mild conditions, i.e., the components should be
“sufficiently different” and their number not unreasonably
large. Although CP format bypasses the curse of dimen-
sionality, CP approximation may involve numerical insta-
bilities for very high-order tensors because the problem is
generally ill-posed due to intrinsic uncloseness.
Tucker decomposition (TD) captures the interactions be-
tween the latent factorsUi using a core tensorG that reflects
the main subspace variation in each mode assuming a mul-
tilinear structure, TD is in the form of
A(i1, · · · , id) ∼=
R1∑
r1=1
R2∑
r2=1
· · ·
Rd∑
rd=1
G(r1, r2, · · · , rd)
U1(i1, r1) U2(i2, r2) · · ·Ud(id, rd)
(2)
TD is non-unique because the latent factors can be rotated
without affecting the reconstruction error. TD yields a good
low-rank approximation of a tensor, since the core tensor G
is the best compression of the original tensor with respect
to squared error. However, Tucker format is not practical
for tensor order d > 5 because the number of entries of the
core tensor scales exponentially with d.
Hierarchical Tucker (HT) decomposition [27, 24] ap-
proximates well high-order tensors (d >> 3) without suf-
fering from the curse of dimensionality. HT requires a priori
2
TN Storage Complexity Storage Bound
CP
∑d
k=1 IkR O(dIR)
TD
∑d
k=1 IkRk +
∏d
k=1Rk O(dIR+R
d)
HT
∑d
k=1 IkRk +
∑
u,v,tRuRvRt O(dIR+ dR
3)
TT
∑d
k=1 IkRk−1Rk O(dIR
2)
Table 1. Storage complexity of TN [14]. d is the tensor order, Ik
and Rk are the size and rank of mode k respectively. The storage
bound is calculated by letting I = maxk Ik and R = maxk Rk
for all possible k in particular TN.
knowledge of a binary tree of matricizations of the tensor,
A(i1, · · · , id) ∼=
Ru0∑
ru0=1
Rv0∑
rv0=1
B(12···d)(ru0 , rv0)
fu0(iu0 , ru0)fv0(iv0 , rv0)
ft(it, rt) ∼=
Ru∑
ru=1
Rv∑
rv=1
Bt(ru, rv, rt)fu(iu, ru)fv(iv, rv)
(3)
where Bt are “transfer” core tensors (internal nodes), fu
and fv are the corresponding left and right child nodes re-
spectively. The leaf nodes contain the latent factors.
Tensor-Train (TT) decomposition [55, 54] decomposes a
given tensor into a matrix, followed by a series of three-
mode “transfer” core tensors, and finally ended by a ma-
trix. Each one of the core tensors is “connected” with its
neighboring core tensors through a common reduced mode
or so-called TT-rank rk with r0 = rd = 1. TT is given by
A(i1, · · · , id) ∼=
R1∑
r1=1
R2∑
r2=1
· · ·
Rd−1∑
rd−1=1
G1(r0, i1, r1)
G2(r1, i2, r2) · · ·Gd(rd−1, id, rd)
(4)
CP and TD are globally-additive models, which means
tensors are represented by a (global) sum over few sep-
arable (rank-1) elements; whereas TT format is locally-
multiplicative type, variables only interact directly with few
local neighbors (slightly-entangled systems) through the
contracted product representations. Table 1 tabulates the
storage complexity and storage bound of different TN. TT
format exhibits both very good numerical properties and al-
lows control of the approximation error within the decom-
position algorithm. Fig. 2 shows the TT-SVD algorithm for
TT decomposition and Section 2.1 explains the basics of
SVD. Mathematical operations in TT format increase the
TT-ranks, TT-rounding algorithm, which is mathematically
similar to TT-SVD but in TT format, can efficiently reduce
the TT-ranks to optimal.
Figure 2. The TT-SVD algorithm for TT decomposition of a 3rd
order tensor. Mk is the matricization of the subtensors. The or-
dering of indices Ik should be symmetric to get consistent SVD
analyses (e.g. decay rate of singular values). For RGB color im-
ages, I1: row indices, I2: channels, and I3: column indices. The
decay rate is averaged over the sequences of SVD decomposition.
2.1. Robust TT-SVD Algorithm
Singular value decomposition (SVD) decomposes a ma-
trix A into left and right singular vectors, the basis vectors
are ranked by the amount of explained variation in A or the
so-called singular values. Mathematically, SVD is given by
A ∼= UΣV T , where U and V are orthonormal matrices that
contain the left and right singular vectors in their respec-
tive columns, the diagonal elements of Σ matrix contain the
corresponding singular values. As shown in Fig. 3 and 4,
the distribution of singular values affect the luminance vari-
ation that accounts for textural changes such as smoothness
/ roughness change; the singular vectors form the basis im-
ages that encode the structural information of the original
image [51]. The TT-SVD algorithm in Fig. 2 is used to
extend SVD analyses to higher-order tensors such as color
images. Unlike discrete Fourier, cosine, or wavelet trans-
form, the basis images of SVD are not fixed but adaptively-
derived, thus allows better representation of the image struc-
ture. Perturbation theory of SVD shows that the closeness
of a singular value from its neighbors controls the sensitiv-
ity of its singular vector to perturbations [63]. It is further
shown that when two singular values are close enough, the
corresponding singular vectors are not unique, approxima-
tion of the change in subspace spanned by the correspond-
ing singular vectors cannot be done with first-order per-
turbation theory but requires higher-order terms [46]. The
singular values of real-life images follow exponential de-
cay distribution, therefore the decay rate provides a scale-
independent measure of the closeness of singular values and
allows comparison of the robustness of multiscale corre-
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Figure 3. The effect of transferring singular values between im-
ages. Last image from top row shows the original image of a mo-
torbike. Bottom row shows the change of luminance / texture after
the transfer of singular value distribution from the top images. Last
image on the bottom row shows the transfer of average of all the
singular values of the top images.
Figure 4. (Left to right, top to bottom) The original and recon-
structed images by combining the left and right singular vectors
from 10, 20, 30, 50, and 100 largest singular values. Singular
vectors encode the multiscale correlation structure of the original
image. It can be observed that large singular values are associated
with large-scale variation (low frequency components) and vice
versa for fine-scale variation (high frequency components).
lation structure to perturbations between different datasets
and image-processing techniques.
Unlike SVD, the transform kernels of convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNN) are learned from data and fixed af-
ter the training is complete; the CNN filters are not con-
strained to be orthogonal, but the domain of possible fil-
ter choices for both SVD and CNN spans the input space.
Once training is complete, the input subspace spanned by
CNN’s filters is a subset of the whole input space. To make
it more precise, suppose we split the input into irrelevant
and relevant parts A + ∆A that activate particular CNN’s
neuron, both parts share a subset of all the singular vec-
tors, i.e., A + ∆A = U(Σ + ∆Σ)V T . In the case that
||Σ|| >> ||∆Σ||, the robustness of the subspace spanned
by the corresponding singular vectors of ∆Σ is determined
by the closeness of the set of singular values and their neigh-
bors. There are a few loss terms in CNN: the approximation
loss due to limited number of transform kernels, the rectifi-
cation loss due to nonlinear activations, spatial pooling, and
dropout layers. The theoretical foundations of CNN in sub-
space approximation are laid down by Kuo [39, 40, 41, 12].
The research on subspace-based signal analysis using SVD
is well-established among the signal processing commu-
nity, in particular the sensitivity of subspace approximation
with individual singular vectors when the singular values
are close [69, 46]. If the singular values are well-separated,
it can be shown that both the singular values and vectors
change in the order of noise magnitude [64]. As will be
shown in Section 4 Experiments, the decay rate of real-life
images is small, therefore we hypothesize that the close sep-
aration between singular values gives rise to the adversarial
examples in deep learning models, i.e., the neuron’s activa-
tion patterns are not unique and extremely sensitive to input
perturbations.
Additionally, we propose a robust SVD algorithm (Al-
gorithm 1) to generate quasi-distinct singular values from
closely-separated ones. In doing so, the resultant singular
vectors are more robust to input perturbations, the recon-
structed images are used to detect strong and static adver-
sarial attacks. First, the cumulative sum in ascending or-
der of the singular values, Sˆ is divided into multiple bins
with exponentially-distributed bin edges. The singular val-
ues and corresponding singular vectors that fall within a bin
are summed up and linearly-combined respectively. This is
in accordance with the theory of degenerate matrix SVD
such that any normalized linear combination of singular
vectors that share the same singular value is a valid singu-
lar vector of that singular value. By merging with TT-SVD
(see Fig. 2), the robust SVD algorithm can be extended to
higher-order tensors such as 2D / 3D color images, videos,
and hyperspectral images. The algorithm is efficient be-
cause the computational complexity increases linearly with
the tensor mode size.
3. Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Adversarial attacks can be targeted or untargeted; the
choice / structure imposed on the input perturbations is typ-
ically shaped by an `p-norm distance metric and computed
with gradient-based or optimization-based techniques with
the objective to decrease the model performance. In our
study, the adversarial strength is measured by normalized
`2-dissimilarity [26], the adversary is assumed to know only
the CNN models but has no ability to influence them.
Adversarial defenses can be broadly categorized into ad-
versarial training and input transformations. Adversarial
training requires prior knowledge of the type of attacks and
train the models to differentiate them, therefore the amount
of computational cost is much higher. Input transformations
use either traditional image-processing techniques or gen-
erative models to remove adversarial examples; the tech-
nique is less expensive but susceptible to adaptive attacks
who know the transformation techniques. We focus on in-
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Algorithm 1 Robust SVD (can replace SVD in TT-SVD or
TT-rounding algorithms, see Fig. 2 for TT-SVD)
input: matrix A.
parameter: α, β of exponential distribution.
output: quasi-distinct singular values S and correspond-
ing (linearly-combined) singular vectors U , V .
Initialize SˆbinEdges ← [0, α exp (βz)], z ∈ {0, 1, · · · }
begin
[U0, S0, V0]← svd(A)
Sˆ0 ← cumsum(S0, ‘reverse′)
index← bucketize(Sˆ0, SˆbinEdges)
S ← accumArray(S0, index, ‘sum′)
U ← accumArray(U0, index, ‘average′)
V ← accumArray(V0, index, ‘average′)
Rearrange S,U, V in descending order of S
Normalize U ← U||U ||2 , V ← V||V ||2
(Optional) SVD rank truncation
Return S,U, V
end
put transformations that have been used against adversarial
attacks in previous studies and explain the reason of their
effectiveness based on our proposed theory.
4. Experiments
Datasets. MNIST [45] is a widely used dataset for
digit classification that was introduced in 1998. It consists
of 28 × 28 pixel grayscale images of handwritten digits.
There are 10 classes (10 digits), 60, 000 training images,
and 10, 000 testing images. Street View House Numbers
(SVHN) [52] is an MNIST-like 32× 32 pixel color images
consists of 73, 257 training images and 26032 testing im-
ages for 10 classes (10 digits). They are taken from Google
Street View images and usually corrupted by natural phe-
nomena like severe blur, distortion, and illumination effects
on top of wide style and font variations [52]. CIFAR-10 [33]
is a dataset released in 2009 that consists of 32 × 32 pixel
color images of 10 mutually exclusive classes with 50, 000
training images and 10, 000 test images. ImageNet [60] is
used for large-scale evaluation, it was first introduced in
2010 and the dataset stabilized in 2012. ImageNet contains
color images of at least 256× 256 pixel with 1000 classes;
only the validation set consists of 50, 000 images (50 per
class) are used. Section 4.1 benchmarks the TN storage
complexity, algorithmic efficiency, and model performance
using these datasets. The privacy and security issues in im-
age recognition are studied using 1000 development (color)
images of 299 × 299 pixel released in NIPS 2017 Adver-
sarial Attacks and Defenses Competition. This dataset is
referred to as “ImageNet” [60] in Section 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4
due to their similar task difficulty.
Experimental Setup. To compute the TN decomposi-
tion in Section 4.1, Matlab 2017a and several toolboxes
are used: Tensorlab 3.0 [71], htucker 1.2 [32], and TT-
toolbox 2.2.2. The compression and decompression time
are benchmarked using Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-1650
v4 @ 3.60GHz 3.60GHz. CP and TD are computed us-
ing Tensorlab “cpd gevd” and “mlsvd” functions, HT using
htucker “htensor.truncate ltr” function, and TT using TT-
toolbox “tt tensor” function. These functions use general-
ized eigenvalue or SVD to speed up the decomposition. Ad-
versarial defenses based on input transformation using color
bit-depth reduction [75], cropping-rescaling, median, gaus-
sian, and non-local means [9] filters are coded using Matlab
functions and toolbox. Image quilting [21], total variance
minimization (TVM) [59], and JPEG compression [20]
are Python implementations by Guo et al. [26]. Adver-
sarial attacks are generated using Tensorflow 1.4.0 [2, 1]
and Cleverhans v2.1.0 [57]. The CNN model for MNIST,
SVHN, and CIFAR-10 is an all convolutional net [62] taken
from Cleverhans model zoo. The ImageNet classifica-
tion is using Inception v3 [66]. Fast Gradient Method
(FGM) [22], Basic Iteration Method (BIM) [42], and Deep
Fool (DF) [50] are gradient-based attacks whereas Carlini-
Wagner (CW) [10] and Elastic Net Method (EAD) [11] are
optimization-based adversarial attacks. We follow closely
the method proposed by Guo et al. [26] to generate adver-
sarial examples with increasing adversarial strength. FGM
and BIM are done by adjusting the hyperparameters; DF
and CW perturbations are amplified to increase the nor-
malized `2-dissimilarity after successful attacks. Univer-
sal Perturbations (UP) [49] and Adversarial Patch (AP) [8]
are strong static attacks which can be image- and network-
agnostic. Only the image-agnostic case is considered here.
UP is generated using BIM in each iteration; whereas AP is
taken from the implementations by Brown et al. [8]. Differ-
ent from other adversarial techniques that manipulate pix-
els within `p distance which may sometimes produce no-
ticeable artifacts, spatially transformed adversarial example
(stAdv) [74] is a new approach that generates realistic ad-
versarial examples with smooth image deformation; their
code is made publicly available by Dumont et al. [19]. In
our study, AP and stAdv are targeted attacks with “toaster”
and randomized targets respectively, others are untargeted
attacks. Because stAdv deforms images smoothly, which
stands in contrast to our proposed theory that adversarial
examples tend to increase the image roughness, we report
the stAdv hyperparameter that regularizes the local distor-
tion characterized by a flow field and adversarial loss used
in our study, i.e., MNIST (10−2), SVHN (10−3), CIFAR-10
(10−3), and ImageNet (10−6). Notice that the regulariza-
tion decreases with dataset complexity, this means that it is
much harder to generate adversarial examples with smooth
deformation for complex images.
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TN Time (ms) Compression Top-1
Ratio Accuracy
MNIST Dataset 0.993
CP N/A N/A N/A
TD 0.6 / 0.3 0.390 0.988
HT 2.5 / 0.5 0.422 0.988
TT 0.39 / 0.07 0.439 0.990
SVHN Dataset 0.951
CP 7.9 / 0.14 0.327 0.945
TD 1.6 / 0.37 0.309 0.950
HT 2.8 / 0.56 0.342 0.950
TT 0.97 / 0.07 0.150 0.929
CIFAR-10 Dataset 0.858
CP 7.8 / 0.13 0.334 0.811
TD 1.6 / 0.39 0.309 0.8105
HT 2.9 / 0.58 0.342 0.809
TT 1.2 / 0.09 0.455 0.833
ImageNet Dataset 0.748
CP 214 / 2.2 0.460 0.535
TD 53.9 / 4.3 0.335 0.693
HT 53.8 / 3.2 0.372 0.703
TT 48.3 / 2.7 0.501 0.655
Table 2. Model performance using TN for input data compres-
sion. The time for compression / decompression per image is mea-
sured in milliseconds. CP decomposition is not available (N/A)
for MNIST dataset because of algorithmic instability. This hap-
pens occasionally for other datasets, hence the original data and
size are used instead for calculation of compression ratio.
4.1. Dimensionality Reduction of Input Data
Table 2 benchmarks the compression / decompression
time for TN with different compression ratio. The time
needed generally increases with TN size. CP decomposi-
tion is about 4× longer than other TN decomposition. TN
decompression time is generally much faster compared to
compression time. After TN decomposition, the cores and
latent factors are quantized to 8-bit depth. Some of the sub-
tensors can be uniformly quantized but some requires non-
uniform quantization using Lloyd’s algorithm [47, 48] to re-
duce the image distortion, e.g., TD’s core G in Eq. 2. It can
be observed that TN generally retains the features for im-
age classification by CNNs without the need to retrain the
model; at least half of the storage size can be saved using
TN for data compression.
4.2. Privacy-Preserving Distributed Data Storage
and Communication
Fig. 5 shows the image distortion as a result of adding
noise to randomly-selected TN subtensor, the effect is larger
if the perturbations is applied on the singular vectors corre-
sponding to the leading singular values, however this infor-
Figure 5. Image distortion resulted from adding noise to a
randomly-selected core of the TN. Note that “random” label in
the x-axis means randomize the sequence in the selected core.
Figure 6. Normalized mutual information between cores and latent
factors of one image (top row) and two different images (bottom
row) for different TNs. Note that “rand” label in the x-axis means
cores with uniformly-distributed noise.
mation is usually unknown to the adversary. CP’s distortion
is larger because the format is more compact compared to
other TNs. Due to the diverse possible topology structure of
decomposition for a given tensor, Wang et al. [72] proposes
three different security models to process data generated by
cyber-physical-social systems, i.e., open model, half-open
model, and encrpted model to process data with different
level of sensitivity and privacy requirements. The tensor
formats and topology structure are made private to selected
users for half-open and encrypted models. Here, we experi-
mentally verify that the neighboring subtensors could not be
identified based on information theory. Mutual information
is commonly used to cross-examine the information con-
tent between subtensors [14]. Fig. 6 shows the normalized
mutual information (NMI) between two subtensors of par-
ticular TN for one image, two images, and random noise,
the results show that they are indistinguishable from each
other. NMI is a universal metric such that any other dis-
tance measure judges two random variables close-by, NMI
will also judge them close. As shown in Fig. 6. the NMI
variation is largely attributed to the variation in subtensor’s
value distribution, if the variation in particular subtensor is
high (i.e., entropy is high), its NMI with other subtensor is
likely to be smaller.
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Datasets Image Size TT-SVD Slope
MNIST (grayscale) 28x28x1 −0.4± 0.5
SVHN (color) 32x32x3 −0.38± 0.12
CIFAR10 (color) 32x32x3 −0.17± 0.04
ImageNet (color) 299x299x3 −0.072± 0.019
ImageNet (color) 299x299x3 −0.061± 0.016
+ 30% noise
Table 3. Robustness of correlation structure of different datasets
measured by the TT-SVD slope. Steeper slope means the sepa-
ration between singular values are larger, hence the subspace ap-
proximation by CNNs is more robust to input perturbations. The
standard deviation of the TT-SVD slope measures the variability of
the estimated value. Notice that adding noise flattens the TT-SVD
slope, hence decreases the robustness of correlation structure.
4.3. Robustness against Adversarial Attacks
The decay rate of leading singular values determines the
robustness of subspace approximation by CNNs. Table 3
tabulates the decay rate for 1000 randomly-selected images
from MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets
using the 5th-25th largest singular values. Coincidentally,
the decay rate correlates well to the datasets’ complexity.
Fig. 7 shows the robustness of the datasets to adversarial
attacks. It can be observed that the steeper the dataset’s
TT-SVD slope, the more robust the dataset to a wide va-
riety of different adversarial attacks. In particular, input
perturbations by stAdv is done by smooth deformation; it
requires much higher adversarial strength for successful at-
tacks compared to other techniques. This agrees with our
theory that adversarial examples tend to decrease the de-
cay rate of singular values to increase sensitivity of the sub-
space approximation by CNNs, hence increase the image
roughness as a result. Table 4 shows that strong adversar-
ial attacks flatten the TT-SVD slope. Effectiveness of de-
fenses based on input transformation has been studied be-
fore, our theory explains the reason why spatial smoothing
techniques provide more resistance to adversarial attacks,
as shown in [26, 75]. This is because spatial smoothing
steepen the TT-SVD slope (see Table 5), hence reduce the
sensitivity of subspace approximation by CNNs.
4.4. Detect Strong and Static Adversarial Attacks
As shown in Table 6, the detection of strong static attacks
using our proposed robust TT-SVD algorithm only requires
bounding the `2-norm between image before and after re-
construction. Currently, the proposed algorithm works well
if the image consists of “simple” correlation structure (high
SVD’s decay rate), e.g., single object recognition. Images
with complex variation or cluttered scene may consider pre-
processing with spatial smoothing and cropping-rescaling
[23] respectively before using the proposed algorithm. Ex-
isting adversarial detection techniques rely on (1) sample
Figure 7. Model accuracy of datasets under adversarial attacks
with increasing adversarial strength measured in normalized `2-
dissimilarity. Notice the robustness of the datasets to adversarial
attacks, i.e., MNIST > SVHN & CIFAR-10 > ImageNet.
Adversarial Top-1 TT-SVD
Attacks (Strength) Accuracy Slope
FGM, `∞ (0.0812) 0.25 −0.068± 0.017 ↑
FGM, `2 (0.0773) 0.25 −0.067± 0.016 ↑
BIM, `∞ (0.0778) 0.016 −0.069± 0.017 ↑
BIM, `2 (0.0784) 0.014 −0.068± 0.016 ↑
CW, `2 (0.0775) 0.17 −0.067± 0.017 ↑
DF, `2 (0.0765) 0.134 −0.066± 0.016 ↑
UP, `∞ (0.0832) 0.196 −0.068± 0.017 ↑
UP, `2 (0.0787) 0.196 −0.068± 0.017 ↑
AP (0.64) 0.0 −0.062± 0.008 ↑
Table 4. Similar to Table 3 but for adversarial attacks. Adversarial
strength is measured by normalized `2-dissimilarity. The upwards
arrow means that the technique flattens the TT-SVD slope by more
than 10% of the slope variability, vice versa for downwards arrow.
The original slope value is −0.072± 0.019.
statistics, (2) prediction inconsistency, and (3) training a de-
tector; (1) is ineffective, (2) needs to process a batch of im-
ages each time, (3) needs to have labelled data and model
training takes time [75]. The robust TT-SVD algorithm pro-
vides a new way to detect adversarial examples directly on
the input; the algorithm is adaptive in nature because the
singular values / vectors are adaptively-derived.
5. Related Work
Tensor decomposition has been used for feature extrac-
tion and classification on multidimensional data [58], recent
work is extended to high-dimensional data with cutting-
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Adversarial Defenses based TT-SVD Slope
on Input Transformation
Spatial Smoothing
Cropping-Rescaling [23] −0.089± 0.026 ↓
Image Quilting [21] −0.079± 0.019 ↓
Median Filter [75] −0.080± 0.020 ↓
Gaussian Filter [75] −0.088± 0.022 ↓
Non-Local Means Filter [9] −0.081± 0.021 ↓
Total Variance Minimization [59] −0.081± 0.020 ↓
Amplitude Quantization
Color Bit-Depth 4-bit −0.071± 0.018
Reduction [75] 3-bit −0.069± 0.017 ↑
Frequency-based Compression
quality level
JPEG [20] 75 −0.072± 0.019
Compression 50 −0.073± 0.019
25 −0.073± 0.019
5 −0.071± 0.017
Table 5. Similar to Table 4 but for adversarial defenses.
Adversarial Norm Adversarial Detection
Attacks Strength Rate
FGM [22] `∞ 0.071 0.997
`2 0.043 0.956
BIM [42] `∞ 0.069 0.997
`2 0.048 0.985
CW [10] `2 0.046 0.944
DF [50] `2 0.037 0.932
UP [49] `∞ 0.052 0.997
`2 0.056 0.994
AP [8] - 0.045 0.991
Table 6. Detection rate of strong and static adversarial attacks. The
adversarial strength is measured by normalized `2-dissimilarity.
The slope of cumulative distribution of TT-SVD is set to −0.03
and truncation error 6 0.03. 337 out of 1000 development im-
ages from NIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and Defenses Compe-
tition are selected by setting the initial `2-norm < 1000. The `2-
dissimilarity of the 337 samples is 0.01. Adversarial attacks are
detected when `2-norm > 1000.
edge tensor techniques such as tensor-train decomposi-
tion [6, 7]. Theoretical links between tensor networks and
deep learning are slowly establishing, for example, the ex-
pressive power of CP and HT decompositions correspond to
shallow and deep networks respectively [17, 18], whereas
TT corresponds to recurrent neural network [29]. Ten-
sor networks have been used to compress and accelerate
deep learning models due to the high redundancy in model
parameters, e.g., fully-connected network [53], convolu-
tional network [30, 67, 43], recurrent network [68], shar-
ing residual units [79], multitask learning [77], multimodal
data [81, 82, 80, 13, 31]. Additionally, tensor power tech-
nique is used to learn latent variable models efficiently with
statistically consistent estimator [5, 28]. Due to the versatil-
ity of tensor representations, tensor techniques have been
proposed for big data networking and management [78,
37, 38, 76, 34], e.g., Internet of Things [3, 36]. Privacy-
preserving techniques for tensor decomposition have also
been studied [73, 35] for cloud computing. Exploring ten-
sor networks as an alternative data structure for efficient and
distributed storage as well as privacy preservation for input
data of deep learning or other machine learning models have
not be been considered before; our study is particularly rel-
evant in the context of edge and fog computing. We exploit
the data redundancy and uses tensor network decomposition
to retain the relevant features for image classification.
In the field of computer vision, SVD has been used
for image denoising, compression, and forensic such as
steganography and watermarking. Higher-order SVD can
help to disentangle the constituents factors or modes of im-
age ensembles, e.g., TensorFaces [70] for facial images with
different lighting conditions, viewpoint and poses. Closely
related to our work is the use of SVD to extract features
for visual quality assessment. Reference images are usu-
ally provided for comparison between images before and
after processing [51], whereas no reference measure re-
quires assumptions on the patches to be analyzed such as
anisotropy [83]; all of the SVD-based image quality met-
rics work on grayscale images. Adversary does not provide
the reference images for comparison; our work extends the
SVD properties to higher-order tensors and analyze the ro-
bustness of correlation structure extracted from input data
for image classification by CNNs.
6. Conclusion
At first glance, it may seems obvious that adversar-
ial attacks increase the image roughness, therefore natural
choices for adversarial defense based on input transforma-
tion should incorporate different levels of spatial smooth-
ing, e.g., local, non-local, edge-preserving, etc. Further ex-
periments show that the robustness against adversarial at-
tacks differ between datasets with different decay rate of
SVD singular values. This suggests that there is a deeper
level connections between adversarial examples in deep
learning models and SVD’s decay rate. Perturbation the-
ory of SVD shows that the closeness between singular val-
ues controls the sensitivity of subspace approximation by
CNNs. Empirical results show that real-life images typi-
cally have slow SVD’s decay rate, which explains the cause
of adversarial examples in CNNs. The subspace approx-
imation is more stable to input perturbations if the CNN’s
loss from approximation, pooling, dropout, and rectification
can be reduced.
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